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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to be invited to this symposium to discuss John Hart
Ely's great book, which focuses our attention on the central constitu-
tional war powers issues. To speak after three distinguished speakers
gives me both an opportunity and a problem. I've prepared a talk, yet
the people who have spoken before waved what to me were red flags. I
have many attributes of a bull and I can't resist the temptation to charge.
My topic for today's panel is whether the Constitution permits the
President to engage in "little wars"-small military interventions and
quick strikes, such as the Libyan bombing, the Grenada and Panama
invasions, and the recent bloodless invasion of Haiti-without first
obtaining congressional approval. Professor Ely has given us a convinc-
ing framework for analyzing that question and has proposed a reason-
able and sensible solution that would restrain the Executive's penchant
for unilaterally initiating military actions: A Proposed Combat Authori-
zation Act.' But as Professor Ely recognizes, such an Act is unlikely to
become law anytime soon. The fundamental reason that Professor Ely's
excellent suggestions will not be celebrated in Washington in the twenti-
eth century has to do with the red flags that both Harold Koh and Abra-
ham Sofaer waved at me, flagging the connection between legal process
and the substance of our national security policy.
* Professor Jules Lobel, University of Pittsburgh Law School, I want to thank my research
assistants Michael Wagner and Alex Gruskos for their help with this article. I thank Professor
Jane Stromseth for her helpful comments on a draft of this article, and Professor Michael Glennon.
Thanks also to LuAnn Driscoll and the staff at the Word Processing Center at the University of
Pittsburgh for their valuable assistance in preparing this manuscript.
1. JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH 115-38 (1993) [hereinafter ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY]; see also John H.
Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379 (1988)
[hereinafter Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted].
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John Ely, Harold Koh, and Michael Glennon have all provided
excellent critiques of post-World War II unilateral warmaking by the
Executive branch, and of the failure of the War Powers Act (also known
as the War Powers Resolution)2 to correct that problem.3 They have
developed good process-oriented solutions to establish joint congres-
sional-executive dialogue and control over decisions to engage in mili-
tary hostilities against other nations. The critique of the War Powers
Resolution is not new. In fact, one of the most prescient critiques of the
Resolution was articulated by Senator Eagleton, who although originally
co-sponsoring the bill, criticized the bill when it reached the floor, and
eventually voted against it.4 Throughout the 1970s, '80s, and '90s,
scholars and politicians continually proposed procedural reforms to cure
the ills of the War Powers Resolution. None was enacted. Now the
question before Congress is not reform, but rather repeal.'
II. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
Neither a lack of thought, a paucity of good suggestions, nor a
dearth of scholarly writing explains the failure to reform the legal pro-
cess by which we go to war. One is tempted to attribute the inability to
fix the War Powers Resolution to a failure of political will. Congres-
sional political weakness-as well documented by Harold Koh, John
Ely and others-certainly is one reason for the failure of the numerous
reform efforts. But more fundamentally, these process reforms have not
been enacted because most of the political elite, including the judicial
branch, view our national interest as substantively requiring a strong
Executive who can act decisively and unilaterally in foreign policy.
Harold Koh's prescription, of first reforming the process to promote
institutional dialogue between the branches, which would create a new
foreign policy consensus,6 is doomed to failure. As Professors Ely and
2. "Despite the fact that (just like a statute) the War Powers Resolution was passed, by a
two-thirds vote of each house, over the President's veto, and thus is understandably often referred
to as the War Powers Act, it is officially a 'Resolution.'" ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 1, at 115.
3. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted, supra note 1; HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Michael J. Glennon,
The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571
(1984); see also Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the
War Powers Resolution, 17 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 715 (1984).
4. THOMAs F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF
CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 207-12 (1974) (discussing the War Powers Resolution's delegation
of power to the President to wage war for 60-90 days without prior congressional approval).
5. See S. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Peace Powers Act of 1995).
6. Harold H. Koh, War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Koh, Dole-Gingrich Congress]; see also KOH, supra note 3, at 153-
228; Harold H. Koh, Reply, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 382, 383-84 (1990) [hereinafter Koh, Reply].
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Koh recognize, there is a direct connection between the legal process
established by the Constitution and a substantive perspective that
reduces our use of military power abroad.7 Thus, the fundamental prob-
lem with the procedural reforms enacted in the 1970s and proposed over
the next two decades is not, as Professor Koh contends, that Congress
"overlooked" various loopholes or executive incentives to flout the law.8
Rather, Congress, the executive and the courts have generally agreed-
despite some dissenting voices-that the President must maintain the
power to act quickly and secretly, particularly with respect to these so-
called little wars. That substantive view precludes process-oriented
reform.
Judge Abraham Sofaer directly expressed the connection between
constitutional process and the substance of national security decision-
making. He stated that "the President is not so powerless, nor the nation
so helpless" as to accept the type of proposals that John Hart Ely has
presented. 9 Judge Sofaer's connection of presidential power to national
power reflects a widespread view that our national power is tied substan-
tively to executive freedom from procedural restraint. Professors Ely,
Koh, Glennon and I all disagree with Judge Sofaer, but until substantial
progress has been made in changing the political elite's view of our
national interest, procedural reform will get nowhere.
Judge Sofaer returned to the connection between substance and
process at the end of his talk. He said that if you mandate that Congress
get involved in these things, "Congress may screw things up every time
it acts or virtually every time it acts."10 He obviously used "screw
things up" to mean that it will prevent-by delay, obfuscation, bureau-
cratic snafus, or lengthy debate-the President from using force in situa-
tions where our national interests require the use of force. The
constitutional judgment that Congress must approve U.S. military
actions abroad reflects the framers' view that congressional slowness,
deliberateness and vacillation play a positive role in reducing Executive
uses of force. Judge Sofaer and much of the nation's elite believe that
the Executive's use of force in Grenada, Libya, Panama, and other areas
of the globe is in our national interest, and that therefore congressional
slowness and inefficiency "will cause more harm than good."' I
When I discuss substantive goals and policy, I do not mean whether
or not you agree with particular policy decisions such as the invasion of
7. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 3-4.
8. See Koh, Reply, supra note 6, at 383, 387.
9. Abraham Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. Miiai L. REv. 33, 34 (1995).
10. Abraham D. Sofaer, Remarks at University of Miami Law Review Symposium (Feb. 24,
1995).
11. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 55.
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Haiti or the air strike on Libya. Rather, I mean that the procedural
norms of the Constitution are connected to a substantive view of
America's role in the world. The framers of the Constitution had a view
of the United States as a non-interventionist, self-protective republic,
and the war powers procedures reflected that view. America's changing
role in the world led to changes in the process. There is no reason for
the political elite to return to a legal process that was designed to hinder
the Executive's ability to engage in limited military actions when a sub-
stantial segment of America's foreign policy makers believe it accords
with America's national interest and role in the world to provide the
President that power. Unless we fundamentally examine and redefine
America's role in the world, we will be stuck with the process that we
have had as a de facto matter for the last fifty years.
Professor Koh believes that we cannot have "a fundamental trans-
formation of the substance of foreign policymaking, when the process of
making that policy is so fundamentally defective."'" We thus have a
sort of which comes first, the chicken or the egg problem. I say that
process cannot be reformed without changing the substance of our for-
eign policy goals and Professor Koh retorts that substance will never
change with such a defective process. Both of us may be right if one
only looks at the institutional actors: Congress, the Executive and the
courts. But fortunately the institutional actors are not the only, albeit
usually dominant, players on our political stage. Substantive and proce-
dural change will occur together, and both changes probably will be
driven by pressures from outside the institutional players, pressures that
will provoke substantial and heated debate within Congress and even
within the Executive branch. The last era of procedural reform occurred
through precisely that kind of process.
The only time in our recent history since the onset of the Cold War
that Congress has shown any political will to deal with these kinds of
issues was in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate. The
mass protest and disgust with the Indochina War and with an imperial
American foreign policy led substantial segments of the elite to change
their positions about the process by which our armed forces are intro-
duced into combat. Important institutional players such as J. William
Fulbright and scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger supported a revival of
the original constitutional warmaking process, usually explicitly draw-
ing the connection between substance and process.1 3 As Professor Ely's
12. Koh, Dole-Gingrich Congress, supra note 6, at 8.
13. Compare J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an
18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7 (1961) ("[T]he price of democratic survival in a
world of aggressive totalitarianism is to give up some of the democratic luxuries of the past.")
with Sen. Fulbright's conversion in the late 1960s to support for reinvigorated congressional role,
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book illustrates, Congress was unwilling to act clearly (if it ever did)
until a late stage of the public protest. Spurred by the public outcry,
Congress enacted several reform statutes between 1973 and 1977: the
War Powers Resolution,' 4 the National Emergencies Act,'5 the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, 16 and the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment.' 7 This period of procedural reform coincided with a tre-
mendous searching as to the substantive values and goals of American
foreign policy after Vietnam. 8 Unfortunately, this reform period never
decisively discarded the old "imperial" thinking and therefore produced
weak statutes and was short lived.' 9
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political mood in America
supported a reassertion of American power abroad. It is thus no acci-
dent that the procedural reforms of the mid-1970s sputtered. Indeed, the
1973-78 period was anomalous for Post World War II America. The
115 CONG. REc. 16618 (June 19, 1969) (remarks of Sen. Fulbright) ("If, in short, America is to
become an empire, there is very little chance that it can avoid becoming a virtual dictatorship as
well."); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
14. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.
between §§ 1601 and 1651 (1988)).
16. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1988)
(repealed 1991)).
18. This same connection between substance and process drove the change in Soviet
constitutionalism in the 1980s. Driven by popular protest, President Gorbachev's substantive
policies in the late 1980s supported Soviet military retrenchment and interest in multilateral
cooperation. Consistent with those new substantive policy goals, President Gorbachev expressly
committed himself to refrain from using armed force (except to repel a surprise attack) outside the
country without approval from the Soviet legislature. Excerpts From Gorbachev Speech on
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at A6.
19. Congressional control over covert warfare is a prime example of the weakness of the
substantive and procedural aspects of the 1970s reform movement. In the immediate aftermath of
Vietnam, the popular revulsion toward covert activities was so pronounced that even influential
insiders such as (former Attorney General and Undersecretary of State) Nicholas Katzenbach
called for the abandonment of all covert operations designed to influence political results in
foreign nations. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy, 52
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 15 (1973). In 1976, the House Select Committee on Intelligence
recommended a prohibition on "all paramilitary activities... except in times of war," H.R. REP.
No. 833, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), while a Senate select committee recommended
prohibiting all "[e]fforts to subvert democratic governments" and two other specific types of
covert action. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk.
1, at 448 (1976). But the furor over covert warfare subsided and Congress eventually settled for
the weak procedural scheme of mere presidential notice of anticipated covert operations to the
Intelligence Committees. Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, §§ 601-02,
105 Stat. 441 (1991) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413b (Supp. 1992) (repealing Hughes-Ryan
Amendment and adopting notice scheme). That weak procedural scheme reflects a general
consensus that the President ought to maintain covert action capability as one of the tools of U.S.
foreign policy.
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rest of the fifty year period witnessed a steady accretion of executive
power and an elite acceptance of such power as a necessary concomitant
of the new U.S. role in the world.
John Ely was right when he entitled, Suppose Congress Wanted a
War Powers Act that Worked, a precursor article to War & Responsibil-
ity.2 If Congress wanted a War Powers Act that worked then Professors
Ely, Koh, Glennon, and others have admirable suggestions. But Con-
gress does not and has not wanted a War Powers Act that worked, as
Professor Ely's article's title implies. Procedural reform proposals are
thus important to instruct Congress on what it could do if it were so
inclined, but those reforms must be integrated with substantive national
security arguments that challenge Congress' underlying reluctance to
reform.
III. LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL
The nation has become accustomed over the past half-century to the
Executive's use of American military power to accomplish limited for-
eign policy objectives. While at times these relatively small uses of
force have escalated into major, protracted confrontations, often-as
was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983,
Libya in 1985, and Panama in 1989-the U.S. military has launched a
quick strike that was over in a relatively short period of time. Despite
protest in Congress and by the general public, Presidents have been able
to get away with these less-than-full-scale wars. American casualties
often are minimal, although as the Panamanian invasion demonstrates,
casualties and destruction among the people we purport to be saving are
sometimes substantial.2' Congress probably would approve many of
these invasions anyway, so the constitutional defect is arguably proce-
dural but not outcome determinative.
The latest example of these kind of military actions was the 1994
bloodless invasion of Haiti. The Clinton Administration's constitutional
justification of the invasion-which at the time commenced expected to
meet armed Haitian resistance-was that war in the constitutional sense
20. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted, supra note 1.
21. Estimates of civilian casualties during the U.S. military invasion of Panama vary widely.
The U.S. Southern Command's official estimate is 202 civilian dead, while former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark reportedly had evidence of 2,000-4,000 civilians killed during the
invasion. E.g., Kenneth Freed, Invasion Ghosts: Panama Tries to Bury Rumors of Mass Graves,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1990, at A3. Several Panamanian residents have filed a complaint with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States seeking
damages from the U.S. Government for losses they suffered during the invasion, but the
Government has been unwilling to pay their claims. E.g., Colman McCarthy, The Price of a "Just
Cause," WASH. POST, May 20, 1990, at F2.
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does not exist where U.S. troops are deployed at the invitation of a fully
legitimate government in circumstances where the nature, scope, and
function of the deployment are such that the use of force involved does
not rise to the level of war.22 This constitutional interpretation assumes
that the President may unilaterally authorize at least some nondefensive
uses of force not undertaken to protect U.S. troops, territories, or citi-
zens, because such hostilities do not rise to the level of war as that term
is used in Article I, Section 8.
Executive unilateral use of military force short of all-out-war
(whatever that means in today's world) raises three basic issues. First,
was the original design of the Constitution to prohibit the President from
authorizing these hostilities short of full-scale war without the consent of
Congress? Second, assuming that was the framers' original intent, does
the historical practice override the original intent? Finally, as a practical
matter, shouldn't we give the President this kind of flexibility?
A. Original Intent
The Administration's letter on the Haitian invasion assumes that
the President need not obtain congressional consent prior to initiating
military actions that do not constitute war in the constitutional sense.
One answer to this argument is that all military actions constitute war in
the meaning of that term in the Constitution. There is, however, another
answer based on an obscure provision of the Constitution that Judge
Sofaer omitted-as do most Executive officials and members of Con-
gress-when he listed the war powers of Congress. The War Powers
Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o... grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal . "...23
Technically, letters of marque and reprisal were authorizations usu-
ally given to private merchantmen to go out and fight the enemy. In the
eighteenth century, nations would issue letters of marque and reprisal to
authorize merchant ships to put guns on their boats, sink or capture
enemy ships, and keep a percentage of the prize thus captured.
From a hypertechnical perspective, the clause can be viewed as
22. Letter from Walter Dellinger, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to Sens. Robert Dole,
Alan Simpson, Strom Thurmond, and William Cohen (Sept. 27, 1994), reprinted in Marian Nash,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 96,
122-26 (1995).
23. The fill text of the War Powers Clause states, "The Congress shall have Power ... To
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Professor Ely relies on this clause to support the
proposition that the framers of the Constitution "provided that all acts of armed combat performed
on behalf of the United States-even if they didn't amount to 'war '--had to be authorized by
Congress." ELY, WAR & RESPONSIBILIY, supra note 1, at 66-67.
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obsolete, since we now have destroyers and aircraft carriers and no
longer need armed fishing boats to fight the enemy. However, scholars
who have discussed the Marque and Reprisal Clause, including Profes-
sor Ely, conclude that the phrase had a much broader meaning at the
time.2 4 Letters of marque and reprisal were one way of referring to what
were known as imperfect wars, special wars, limited wars-all of which
constituted something less than full-scale warfare. For example, Sir
Matthew Hale, a well-known legal scholar in the seventeenth century
familiar to the constitutional framers, wrote: "Special kinds of wars are
that which we usually call marque and reprisal. ' ' 5 James Kent, in his
authoritative Commentaries on American Law referred to special letters
of marque and reprisal as "imperfect war[s], ' 6 which are "compatible
with a state of peace. '27 Blackstone noted that the "prerogative of grant-
ing [letters of marque and reprisal] .. .is nearly related to ... making
war; this being indeed only an incomplete state of hostilities.'"28
The framers and early leaders of the nation thus viewed letters of
marque and reprisal as falling within the notion of imperfect war, incom-
plete hostilities, or limited warfare. Joseph Story, citing Blackstone,
noted that the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal was "plainly
derived from that of making war," being "an incomplete state of hostili-
ties," often ultimately leading to a formal declaration of war.29 Albert
Gallatin argued that the grant of letters of marque and reprisal was "an
24. See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 66-67; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL
WAR POWER 3, 180 (1995) (arguing that President's use of private persons to engage in covert
paramilitary activities abroad usurps Congress' exclusive power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal); EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 37 (1982) (arguing that framers intended the
Marque and Reprisal and War Clause to vest both general and limited war-making power in
Congress, not in the President); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS 63-65 (1981) (arguing that framers' grant to Congress of power to issue letters of
marque and reprisal and to declare war was intended to convey legislative control over all uses of
American force in combat, except when in response to a sudden attack); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH &
EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 17-22 (1986) (arguing that the Marque and
Reprisal and War Clause limits the President's authority to use offensive force to instances of
hostile invasion and congressionally declared wars); Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional
Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986) (discussing
Marque and Reprisal Clause generally and its application to covert warfare); Charles A. Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 679-80,
695-97, 699-700 (1971-72).
25. M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
162 (S. Emlyn ed. 1736) (1st ed. London 1680).
26. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 62 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1989) (1826).
27. Id. at 61.
28. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 258 (Garland
Publishing, photo. reprint 1978) (1765).
29. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray 1833).
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intermediate state between peace and war,"3 and generally preceded
war, "[w]hen it has not been thought proper to come to open war at
once."
3
'
The original drafts of the Constitution did not mention letters of
marque and reprisal.32 Immediately after the substitution of "declare
war" for "make war,"33 Elbridge Gerry recommended that something be
"inserted concerning letters of marque, which he thought not included in
the power of war."'34 The timing of Gerry's amendment indicated that
he and others probably believed that any possible narrowness implied by
the authority to "declare war" made it necessary to include the use of
force in time of peace among the enumerated congressional powers.
Indeed, Joseph Story and others recognized that, while the power to
declare war would itself carry the incidental power to grant letters of
marque and reprisal, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention may
have thought the express power to grant letters of marque and reprisal
necessary, "because it is often a measure of peace, to prevent the neces-
sity of a resort to war."'35 By including the Marque and Reprisal Clause
in Article I, Section 8, the framers attempted to ensure that only Con-
gress would have the power to commence armed hostilities against for-
eign nations, whether those hostilities constituted full-scale war or some
lesser or imperfect warfare.
The early history of the nation also supports a reading of the Mar-
que and Reprisal Clause that provides Congress the power to authorize a
30. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1511 (1798).
31. Id.
32. REVELEY, supra note 24, at 74-86 (documenting that marque and reprisal provisions were
not discussed until the fourth month of the Constitutional Convention and were not part of earlier
drafts of the Constitution).
33. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-29 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (chronicling the debate).
34. Id. at 326. Gerry made his motion on Aug. 18, 1787, the day after the "make war" debate.
The only significant mention of letters of marque and reprisal in the pre-convention and
ratification debates is Madison's comment that, while the Articles of Confederation granted
Congress, as opposed to the states, sole power to grant such licenses during peacetime, the
Constitution extended this authority to wartime as well. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 299
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The removal of State power to grant letters of
marque and reprisal during wartime was designed to "insure uniformity in all points which relate
to foreign powers," according to Madison, and to ensure "immediate responsibility to the nation in
all those, for whose conduct the nation itself is responsible." Id.
35. STOR, supra note 29, at 63. James Kent noted, "Reprisals by commission, or letters of
marque and reprisal.., is another mode of redress for some specific injury, which is considered to
be compatible with a state of peace .... " KENT, supra note 26, at 61. Thomas Jefferson noted,
"(G]eneral letters of marque and reprisal" may be preferred to a formal declaration of war,
"because on a repeal of their edicts by the belligerent, a revocation of the letters of marque
restores peace without the delay, difficulties and ceremonies of a treaty." Letter from President
Jefferson to Mr. Lincoln (Nov. 13, 1808), 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 195 (Albert
E. Bergh ed., 1907).
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broad spectrum of armed hostilities not rising to the level of declared
war. For example, as President Washington's Secretary of State,
Thomas Jefferson included within the congressional power to issue let-
ters of marque and reprisal the power to order general reprisals against a
foreign nation using the public armed forces.36 Similarly, James
McHenry, John Adams' Secretary of War, and Alexander Hamilton, a
former Secretary of the Treasury, advised President Adams that any
executive exercise of American naval force beyond defending the
nation's seacoast, American vessels, or commerce within American
waters "come[s] within the sphere of reprisals and . . . require[s] the
explicit sanction of that branch of the government which is alone consti-
tutionally authori[z]ed to grant letters of marque and reprisal. 37
Thus, the Marque and Reprisal Clause was inserted in Article I to
ensure that lesser forms of hostilities came within congressional power.
Even a technical reading-of the clause to cover only letters authorizing
privateers supports that interpretation. Why would the framers give
Congress power to authorize minor uses of force by private parties, if
they did not also mean for Congress to have power to authorize major
use of American armed forces for invasions of other countries or other
hostile military actions against other nations. The Marque and Reprisal
Clause probably was intended to cover all reprisals or uses of force
against other nations short of declared war. At minimum, the clause
supports a broad interpretation of the Declare War Clause to include all
acts of warfare initiated against other nations.
B. Historical Practice
Despite the clear evidence that the Marque and Reprisal Clause
required that even "little wars" be authorized by Congress, Presidents in
the twentieth century and particularly in the past fifty years have regu-
larly engaged U.S. armed forces in hostile actions without first seeking
36. Jefferson noted that "making a reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing" often leading to
war. Therefore "the right of reprisal [is] expressly lodged with [Congress] by the Constitution,
and not with the Executive." Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of State (May 16, 1793), 7
JEFFERSON'S WORKS 628, reprinted in 7 MOORE, DIGEST § 1095, at 123 (emphasis added).
37. Letter from James McHenry to John Adams (May 18, 1798), reprinted in ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 155 (1976).
Hamilton had advised McHenry that the president's constitutional power went no further than the
authority "to repel force byforce .... Any thing beyond this must fall under the idea of reprisals
& requires the sanction of that Department which is to declare or make war." Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), reprinted in 21 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461-62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974). Hamilton reiterated that the power
to authorize any reprisal was a congressional power when he noted that the effect of the 1795 Jay
Treaty with England was "to restrain the power and discretion of Congress to grant reprisals till
there has been an unsuccessful demand for Justice." The Defence No. XXXVII, reprinted in 20
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra, at 17 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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congressional approval. Professor Ely's answer to the historical practice
argument is right: "[T]he War Clause made an unmistakable point that
needed no further gloss . . . .Usurpation isn't precedent, its usurpa-
tion."38 The clarity of the constitutional command removes the War
Powers Clause from the Jacksonian and Frankfurtian Youngstown analy-
sis, 39 which should apply only when constitutional ambiguity, vague-
ness, or silence requires a more careful analysis of the practice of the
executive and legislative branches.4 ° Moreover, if usurpation could
make a difference, the historical practice here does not meet the standard
articulated by Frankfurter in Youngstown: "systematic, unbroken, execu-
tive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress ...."'I
Even if the recent practice of post-World War II Presidents could
be viewed as demonstrating a consistent pattern of unilateral executive
use of force, it fails to override Article I, Section 8 for yet another rea-
son. New constitutional custom, similar to international custom,
requires not merely systematic practice, but also the element of "opinio-
juris," 42 that the branches accept or at least acquiesce that the practice
constitutes law.43 Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution, albeit
nonenforceable and hortatory, does reflect Congress' constitutional view
that the President does not have the constitutional authority to introduce
American troops into limited hostilities except in narrowly defined
emergency situations. Thus, executive practice to the contrary has been
at least formally rejected by Congress and cannot constitute constitu-
tional custom.'
Yet, while I agree with Professor Ely's rejection of historical prac-
tice modifying the text de jure, in effect the Constitution has been
amended de facto. What has arisen in the past forty to fifty years is a
growing gap between what Michael Reisman and James Baker term
38. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 10.
39. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-628, 634-55 (1952).
40. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 9-10.
41. Id. at 10, quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42. The term is defined as:
The concept of opinio juris sive necessitatis, which apparently derives from the
writings of the French jurist Francois Geny, describes a distinction between legal
custom and acts of the sort that 'remain outside the positive legal order.'
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 59 (1990) (quoting FRANCOIS GENY,
METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE § 110 (1898)).
43. GLENNON, supra note 42, at 59-60; Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
610 ("systematic, unbroken, executive practice ... never before questioned").
44. While Congress has clearly acquiesced in presidential adventures that violate the War
Powers Resolution, and on occasion has suggested that certain of its provisions, such as § 2(c)'s
disallowance of unilateral executive action to rescue citizens, ought no longer be law, the War
Powers Resolution has not been repealed or amended, and therefore still formally retains the law.
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law's "myth system" (reflected, for example, in the hortatory 2(c) of the
War Powers Resolution) and law's "operational code," which can be
found "in elite behavior" (executive initiation of quick strikes and con-
gressional and judicial acquiescence).45 The formal law is accurately
described by Professor Ely; the operational code corresponds to elite
behavior.
The problem of unilateral executive warmaking has not resulted
from the formal amendment or de jure modification of constitutional
restraints on the President, and therefore the solution cannot lie simply
in the amendment of the formal, de jure law. Rather, the de facto devel-
opment of an alternative code of constitutional warmaking, like the
development of de facto segregation, can only be rooted out by attacking
the social structure that creates it: in this case, elite values and
expectations.
The elite has abandoned the constitutional warmaking process de
facto because that process is seen as obsolete and inconsistent with
American foreign policy needs as the world power. If the original
design of the Constitution is obsolete, if it no longer reflects our values
and foreign policy goals, then holding fast to the framers' original intent
would contradict my jurisprudential views with respect to the abortion
controversy and constitutional interpretation generally. In the due pro-
cess or equal protection context, I would argue that the Constitution
should be interpreted as a living document, reflecting the fundamental
changes that have occurred in American society since 1787 or 1868.
Consistency would require taking a similar position with respect to the
foreign affairs provision of the Constitution.46 So for me, the key ques-
tion becomes: is the framers' design obsolete?
C. Obsolescence
The Constitution's war powers provisions originally served several
important goals and values. Some continue unabated into the late twen-
tieth century, while others have been undermined. The first, democratic,
value was that congressional deliberation would ensure that major for-
eign policy decisions would not be made by one person alone, but rather
45. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMEs E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES,
CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW
23-24 (1992).
46. The original intent theorists have not been consistent, eschewing a careful analysis of the
original meaning of the foreign policy provisions of the Constitution. See generally Jules Lobel,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Transformation of the Original Understanding, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 273 (D. Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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would require "the assent of other independent minds. 4 7 Moreover, the
framers sought to ensure popular control over decisions to initiate hostil-
ities by placing power in the branch that was structurally most closely
connected to the people. This democratic value has become even more
important in today's era of centralized government and a powerful Exec-
utive branch.
But several other substantive values served by the War Powers
Clause have been undermined by late twentieth century developments.
The framers believed that a militarily weak America should avoid for-
eign entanglements and emphasize commerce rather than military
power.4a Moreover, they worried that Executive adventurism might risk
both the young nation itself and many American casualties.49 Limited
wars still can become major wars, as Vietnam demonstrates, and there-
fore the framers' concerns that the United States follow a foreign policy
of emphasizing commercial relations and not military power continue
unabated. Indeed, as Paul Kennedy and others have persuasively
argued, a great power's extension of its military power globally often
chokes its economic life, leading to its decline. But, our country is no
47. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1512,
at 342 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
48. Peace was a necessary condition for the new nation's success. As Secretary of State
Randolph observed in 1795:
An infant country, deep in debt; necessitated to borrow in Europe; without
manufactures; without a land or naval force; without a competency of arms or
ammunition; with a commerce, closely connected beyond the Atlantic, with a
certainty of enhancing the price of foreign productions, and diminishing that of our
own; with a constitution little more than four years old; in a state of probation, and
not exempt from foes; such a country can have no greater curse in store for her than
war. That peace was our policy has been admitted by Congress, by the People, and
by France herself.
Letter from Randolph to James Monroe (June 1, 1795), reprinted in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS
706 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clark eds., Washington, Gales and Seaton 1832). Jeffer-
son, in his Third Annual Message, in 1803, makes this point:
Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe, and from the political inter-
ests which entangle them, together with products and wants which render our com-
merce and friendship useful to them and theirs to us, it cannot be the interest of any
to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise, indeed, were we
to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the
opportunity she has endowed us with of pursuing, at a distance from foreign conten-
tions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness; of cultivating general friendship,
and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpirage of reason rather than of force.
Neutrality, 3 Wharton DIGEST § 402, at 594 (1887). Similarly, Washington in his Farewell
Address made clear that "[t]he great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible."
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra, at 37.
49. See James Madison (Helvidius), No. 4 in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 174 (G. Hart
ed., 1906) ("War is, in fact, the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.").
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longer isolated, and a powerful America flexing its muscles is unlikely
to lose or suffer substantial American casualties when we invade a Gre-
nada, Panama or Haiti, or launch an air strike against Libya or Iraq.
Therefore, the elite and the population mostly accept, if not approve of,
executive unilateralism.
Yet, even splendid little wars with few American casualties often
have substantial costs that implicate the values underlying the War Pow-
ers Clause. The framers believed that the Republic should and would
behave generally in a peaceful, non-hegemonic way toward the world."
The foreign policy provisions of the Constitution "expressed the polit-
ical and social [republican] ideology of the Revolutionary leaders," that
rejected pacifism, but limited the use of force to defensive actions.5"
That monarchies were generally thought to be the source of warfare
accounts in part for Elbridge Gerry's remark at the Constitutional Con-
vention that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war.15 2
Therefore, the framers sought to prevent "monarchical" or "impe-
rial" warfare driven by executive adventurism even if the lives lost in
those adventures were primarily Panamanian, Libyan, or Grenadian. 3
The moral indefensibility of implicitly discounting Panamanian lives-
which is inherent in the view that the Panamanian invasion was merely a
"little war" (little for whom?)-is reflected in war powers provisions
that ensured that all hostile armed actions be subject to searching consti-
tutional scrutiny. A republic demands no less. An adventurist military
policy overseas is inconsistent with Republican values, even if no Amer-
ican lives are thereby lost. The inconsistency between an Imperial for-
eign policy and a Republican domestic constitutional order is not merely
immoral, but will eventually wreak havoc on our domestic institutions.
As Henry Steele Commager noted during the Vietnam War, "If we sub-
vert world order and destroy world peace, we must inevitably subvert
and destroy our own political institutions first."'54 Therefore, the repub-
50. REGINALD C. STUART, WAR AND AMERICAN THOUGHT: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
MONROE DOCTRINE 37-38 (1982) (because of republican institutions, the framers thought America
would only get involved in defensive wars); MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL
CONSCIENCE 25 (1978) (explaining that liberal philosophers of the 18th century assumed that
"'peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic' ") (quoting 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 155 (T. Nugent trans., New York 1912) (1750)).
51. STUART, supra note 50, at 66.
52. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 318.
53. Of course, the scholarly community has debated the merits and the "imperial" nature of
these military actions. I cannot ih this essay revisit that debate. I merely argue here that an
imperial American foreign policy is inconsistent with both the framers' values and what I believe
American values ought to be today, even if very few American casualties result.
54. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
NATIONAL CHARACTER 58 (1974).
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lican values underlying the War Powers Clause are still relevant in
today's world, and ought to motivate our foreign policy even though
they currently do not.
IV. PROCEDURAL V. SUBSTANTIVE REFORM APPROACHES
Professor Ely and I start from the same basic proposition that all
acts of combat engaged in on behalf of the United States must have to be
authorized by Congress, unless such action repels a sudden attack. But,
to parry arguments that the constitutional design no longer meets the
current situation, Professor Ely somewhat reluctantly agrees that the
phrase "repel sudden attacks" ought to be read to permit the President to
act unilaterally whenever she is "unable" to secure Congress' advance
authorization, either because time does not permit or military effective-
ness would be undermined." Therefore, his Proposed Combat Authori-
zation Act requires the President to obtain advance authorization prior to
placing U.S. forces in potential combat situations, except "where a clear
threat to the national security has developed so rapidly as to preclude
Congress's advance consideration of such authorization, or keeping the
pendency of the United States' response to such a threat secret prior to
its initiation is clearly essential to its military effectiveness .... "I'
Those two broad exceptions render the entire advance authorization
provision hortatory. As Ely recognizes, judicial enforcement of such an
open-ended provision is inconceivable, and voluntary compliance is
unlikely.57 Recent history suggests the President will almost always
argue that time or military effectiveness require unilateral action. For
example, the executive branch would have argued that the Grenada and
Panama invasions, and the air strikes against Libya and Iraq all fell
within Professor Ely's exceptions. Secretary of State Christopher more
recently claimed that the Haiti invasion which had been threatened and
telegraphed for weeks was within the President's constitutional authority
because "[W]e can't tie the hands of the President. The President may
have to act in a situation very quickly and on his own constitutional
authority. '58 Because of the obvious inability of any statute to define
substantively with precision the limits of the Executive's unilateral war-
making power once the "repel sudden attacks" phrase is reinterpreted to
mean "respond to a serious emergency," Ely believes that the "proce-
dural" approach of setting forth time restraints on executive power
55. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 6-7, 76-77, 108-09.
56. Id. at 133.
57. Id. at 118, 126.
58. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has Authority He Needs to Invade Haiti, Top Aides Say, N.Y.
TIEs, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1.
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"shows greater promise of making a difference." 9 Thus his main opera-
tive suggestions are to lower the time limit to twenty days and provide
judicial enforceability of that limitation.
I agree that Professor Ely's approach would make a major differ-
ence, presuming a different substantive climate permitting the enactment
and enforcement of his proposed statute. The President would have to
request congressional authorization whenever she launched a "little
war," or strike, or intervention, and twenty days is a relatively short
period within which to operate. I would be quite happy to see Professor
Ely's statute enacted.
But I'm not convinced it is the best approach. After the President
launches an armed expedition, public approval will undoubtedly be high,
and the impetus to rally around the flag (or in this case the President)
tremendous. The statute will probably work to create congressional
debate and vote, but in the worst circumstances-while U.S. forces are
fighting and possibly dying abroad. Moreover, recent history demon-
strates that many "little wars" are basically over in twenty days-Gre-
nada, Panama, Haiti, Libya, Baghdad air strike-leaving Congress and
the President to wrangle about the mop-up, policing operations. Of
course, if the "little war" went unexpectedly badly and turned into a
protracted conflict, then congressional debate would ensue, but that gen-
erally happens anyway. Congress did eventually debate the Lebanon
operation and the Nicaraguan covert war, although Professor Ely's stat-
ute would require that debate to take place within twenty days. While a
vote within twenty days would probably be a positive development, the
proposed statute might place Congress at the disadvantage of voting
when the war fever was at its height, and not before commencement of
military action or after months of protracted struggle when the popular
support for the war was low.
For Professor Ely, there is no alternative to the procedural approach
based on time. He foreclosed a substantive approach by his concession
that "repel armed attacks" must be read more broadly today than in
1787. There is no need for Ely's concession. Can one think of any case
in the past several decades where the President launched an armed
action against another nation and was unable to secure advance authori-
zation from Congress because of time or military effectiveness? The
Libyan or Baghdad air strikes could have been authorized by Con-
gress-military effectiveness merely required that the details and timing
of the operation be secret. The Panamanian and Haitian invasions were
threatened for months and involved long-standing problems. As Judge
59. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 119.
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Sofaer recounts,6 0 both the Panamanian and Libyan operations were dis-
cussed for many months before actually launched. The Grenada inva-
sion was arguably time driven, but only if you buy the implausible and
factually inaccurate proposition that the operation was a direct response
to the threat that American medical students would be taken hostage.
And as Professor Ely convincingly argues, even covert operations
become known to the enemy within hours or days of their undertaking,
and therefore constitutional authorization would generally be required
fairly rapidly. 61 Moreover, launching a surprise attack against an enemy
who has not attacked us ought not be a reasonable justification for
avoiding the constitutional process. The phrase "repel sudden attacks"
simply cannot, with any rationality, be turned into a justification for
"launching sudden attacks." For example, the Bay of Pigs operation
could be an example (albeit a bad one) of an invasion that required
secrecy for military effectiveness (or ineffectiveness), but that turns out
to be simply because we wanted to launch a surprise attack. Ely's con-
cession turns out to be driven by hypotheticals, not reality.
Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can
be adequately served if the President's power to use American forces in
combat unilaterally is reserved to repelling sudden attacks on American
troops, territory, and citizens. 62 That substantive line written into a
Combat Authorization Act would be both politically and judicially
enforceable. And repelling means just that; it does not mean retaliating
for an attack on an American citizen or soldier that took place several
days, weeks or months before. The President can respond defensively to
attacks that have been launched, not to rumors, reports, intuitions, or
informed intelligence warnings of attacks. President Roosevelt could
not have and should not have attacked Japan in the fall of 1941 based on
intelligence reports that the Emperor was planning war. He could send
American fighter planes to intercept Japanese planes once the attack was
launched. While there may be difficult cases where determining when
an armed attack has been launched (was it when Japan sent out the air-
craft carriers or when the planes were airborne?), most situations will be
clear.
60. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 53-54.
61. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 110-12.
62. I do not accept an exception for repelling an imminent attack on civilians or troops. Such
an exception is subject to tremendous abuse, as Presidents can easily claim that American citizens
around the globe might be subject to "imminent" attack, and the facts would be difficult to
determine dispositively. Generally, one can defend against imminent attacks by bolstering
citizens' or troops' protection, or withdrawing them to safer more secure positions, and if
necessary seeking congressional authorization to militarily respond. Actual attacks require
military action, imminent threats do not.
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There are, of course, hypothetical situations that do not meet the
test I articulate in which we all nevertheless would want the President to
respond unilaterally. If the President had overwhelming evidence that
some terrorist nation would have a destructive chemical weapon opera-
tional within a week and was planning to detonate it over New York
City, all of us-except perhaps extreme New York haters-would allow
the President to use American air power to destroy the weapon. But one
can always find hypotheticals that undermine established legal doctrine.
I once saw a movie in which a police officer brutally tortured a vicious
criminal in order to get the criminal to divulge where he had buried a
little girl with only a few hours' supply of oxygen. Do I support a legal
doctrine in which police officers can torture victims when it is such an
emergency that they need to get at information immediately? I don't.
Yet while watching this movie I hoped the police officer got the infor-
mation in time using any method necessary.
Many of the founders had a theory of "emergency" that dealt with
these kinds of hypotheticals, 3 but it was not that the Executive could act
lawfully in excess of constitutional or statutory authority in the emer-
gency situations posed by these hypotheticals. Rather, it was that there
may be some exigent situations where an Executive official may have to
act in violation of the Constitution.64 But the official must openly
acknowledge that he or she acted unlawfully, and allow for review of the
unlawful conduct by Congress or the courts and terminate the action
when the emergency ended. Most early leaders of the Republic believed
that the problems associated with creating a constitutional basis for the
exercise of emergency power outweighed the dangers of allowing the
President to act extra-constitutionally and unlawfully in extreme crisis
situations.65 They believed that a grant of emergency power with vague
limitations like "military necessity" inevitably would lead to a vast
assertion of executive power unjustified by actual emergencies. Justice
Jackson's more recent comment that "[E]mergency powers ... tend to
63. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1392-97 (1989).
64. Id.
65. Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), sounded the
same theme. He recognized that military necessity might often require that the "paramount
consideration" be that the government's
measures be successful rather than legal. . . .But if we cannot confine military
expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve
all that the military may deem expedient .... A military commander may overstep
the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve,
that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a
generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.
Id. at 244, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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kindle emergencies"" has proved true in the war powers area.
A return to the original design of allowing the Executive emer-
gency power only to repel actual attacks would in all likelihood elimi-
nate the purported emergencies that have driven U.S. policy for decades.
And if a real emergency did arise, Jefferson's and Lincoln's policy of
acting extra-constitutionally to save the nation and later seeking con-
gressional ratification for their actions is an appropriate response.
The imagery of crisis and emergency pervaded the Cold War era,
and was utilized to justify an extension of American power around the
globe.67 The end of the Cold War has led to several contradictory
impulses. Probably the dominant trend amongst policy makers has been
to search for new crises, new rationales, and new justifications for using
U.S. military power abroad. The post-Cold War world may yet, how-
ever, provide an impetus for a substantive reassessment of the U.S. role
in the world. Such a substantive transformation might breathe new life
into an original constitutional design that was largely abandoned during
the Cold War era.
66. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
67. See Lobel, supra note 63, at 1400-03.
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